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In his book Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein 
demonstrates a methodology by which language can be 
observed and investigated. The investigation’s focus is on 
grammar since “essence is expressed in grammar” and 
“grammar tells what kind of object anything is” (Wittgen-
stein 2001, §371, §373). Yet, what does the concept 
‘grammar’ mean? Terms such as Depth Grammar and 
Surface Grammar that Wittgenstein uses may be hinting to 
the fact that there are (at least) two grammar levels, 
however, in fact, he does not provide us with a full and 
clear definition of these terms.  
Wittgenstein repeatedly warns against the tendency to 
formulate theories whose goal is to explain the linguistic 
operation. Instead, he suggests focusing on the descrip-
tion.1 However, while closely examining the Investigations, 
one can point to a central tension revealed throughout the 
investigation between refraining to define and moral 
judgment on the one hand, and the very existence of 
human communication within which people agree upon 
definitions and judgments. A person chooses his words, 
and sometimes does not even know how to do it because 
“it is only in normal cases that the use of a word is clearly 
prescribed; we know, are in no doubt, what to say in this or 
that case. The more abnormal the case, the more doubtful 
it becomes what we are to say”(Wittgenstein 2001, §142). 
Despite the fact that “every sentence in our language ‘is in 
order as it is” (Wittgenstein 2001, §98), Nevertheless, 
there is room for doubt and error: “so you are saying that 
human agreement decides what is true and what is false? 
It is what human beings say that is true and false and they 
agree in the language they use” (Wittgenstein 2001, §241-
242).  
When language is actually used we apply, in fact, double 
judgment: The person ‘decides’ what to say under certain 
circumstances and the people he converses with judge 
whether what has been said is ‘true’ or ‘false’: “the sense 
of a sentence… may, of course, leave this or that open, 
but the sentence must nevertheless have a definite sense. 
An indefinite sense, that would really not be a sense at all. 
This is like: an indefinite boundary is not really a boundary 
at all” (Wittgenstein 2001, §99). This double judgment is 
done based on a mutual agreement on a certain form of 
life. There is no book in which the agreed upon rules of 
definitions and judgments are included (unlike grammar 
book). Living within a certain form of life provides the 
background needed for communication and for judging the 
linguistic use. 
This instruction raises two questions that may be an-
swered by distinguishing between DG and SG. The first 
question is: what can be defined as grammatical charac-
teristics? The second question is: How does Wittgenstein’s 
distinction between the two types of grammar assist when 
one needs to clarify and describe a state of mind as 
religious belief? Such a state of mind is a distinct test-case 
of ‘language work’ in two ways: First, translating the state 
of mind into words; the other refers to the unique charac-
teristic a believer pours into the religious linguistic game: 
“the way you use the word ‘God’ does not show whom you 
mean, but what you mean” (Wittgenstein 1998, p.58).  
                                                     
1 See for example Wittgenstein 2001, & 91, &109, & 299, &436, &296. 
The following process is two-fold. First, it follows Witt-
genstein’s statements that can clarify and shed light on his 
distinction between Depth Grammar and Surface Gram-
mar. Later on, in the second stage, it introduces Wittgen-
stein’s religious perception’s major characteristics from 
their Depth Grammar perspective. The major claim is that 
Wittgenstein actually formulates a grammatical method to 
be used when investigating religious belief, yet it includes 
an inner contradiction: On the one hand, he formulates 
certain religious belief criteria while negating others; on the 
other hand, he formulates an investigation method based 
upon tolerance and pluralism. However, his method 
stipulates that a certain linguistic term can be understood 
when one understands the specific form of life in which it 
has been created although it should not be adapted to 
existing grammatical rules (in complete opposition to the 
scientific discourse). It seems to me that the tension 
between the two forms of reference to religious belief is 
actually the existing tension between Depth Grammar and 
Surface Grammar, the one that exists between an external 
observation of a language and a deep one that tries to 
comprehend what words are trying to say, what words 
‘mean’. 
Wittgenstein described how frustrating can the gram-
matical investigation be when trying to distinguish between 
surface and depth since “the deep aspect of this matter 
readily eludes us” (Wittgenstein 2001, §387). Man is 
bothered by the difficulty to understand language’s depth: 
“the problems arising though a misinterpretation of our 
forms of language have the character of depth. They are 
deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the 
forms of our language and their significance is as great as 
the importance of our language” (Wittgenstein 2001, 
§111). Wittgenstein compares the significant of the worries 
to the importance of language since the need to fully 
understand how a language functions is central and 
important as much as the need for the language’s 
existence.  
Wittgenstein points out a number of the grammatical 
study characteristics. First, it derives from the wish to 
understand the basis upon which language is founded; 
second, the study is carried out by examining analogies 
between words that sometimes results in exchanging one 
word for the other, a process that best clarifies the difficulty 
we are facing. The third point is that grammatical analysis 
entails simultaneously taking apart the grammatical unit 
and the anxiety it arises. 
Wittgenstein refers directly to the ‘depth grammar’ only 
in two articles, yet they are invaluable: “’but the words, 
significantly utterd, have after all not only a surface, but 
also the dimension of depth!’ After all, it just is the case 
that something different takes place when they are uttered 
significantly from when they are merely uttered. How do I 
express this is not the point. Whether I say that in the first 
case they have depth; or that something goes on in me, 
inside my mind, as I utter them; or that they have an 
atmosphere, it always come to the same thing. ‘well, if we 
all agree about it, won’t it be true?’” (Wittgenstein 2001, 
§594). “in the use of words one might distinguish ‘surface 
grammar’ from ‘depth grammar’. What immediately 
impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the 
way it is used in the construction of the sentence, the part 




of its use… that can be taken in by the ear. And now 
compare the depth grammar, say of the word ‘to mean’, 
with what its surface grammar lead us to suspect. No 
wonder we find it difficult to know our way about” (Wittgen-
stein 2001, §664). 
The distinction between depth Grammar and Surface 
Grammar is not necessarily one perceived by the eye or by 
one’s ear. Gordon P. Baker referred in the most compre-
hensive article regarding Depth Grammar claims that we 
are actually investigating the language game in which 
someone uses a certain word but in fact refers to a wider 
definition of language game. Following Wittgenstein 2001, 
§7 Baker emphasizes that we should clarify the circum-
stances in which a certain sentence is created rather than 
the grammatical principles upon which it is structured 
(Baker 2001). It is the investigator’s task to examine 
whether the word has a meaning that plays a role in 
human activity and in light of the results examine the 
various ways the given word integrates in such an activity. 
Such an investigation can be carried out by studying the 
created picture or the picture that accompanies a certain 
word and the depth grammar can then be used to 
emphasize the word’s use in its various shapes. The goal 
is not to offer a certain interpretation to a given sentence 
the way ‘depth grammar’ does since according to 
Wittgenstein one cannot even define what a sentence is 
(Wittgenstein 2001, §135). This is why such an investiga-
tion is open to discussion and to different readings that are 
dependent upon the interpreter’s life experience and form 
of life.2 Although what Baker suggests can be referred to 
as the main road of the Wittgenstein’s investigation it does 
not contribute enough to understanding the distinction 
between the two grammars since he ignores the reason of 
use (the meaning) and focuses on result (the variety of 
use). Wittgenstein does not exemplify the meaning of 
depth Grammar by using the verb ‘mean’ accidentally: 
according to him the context each speaker pours into the 
‘meaning’ of his expression actually is depth Grammar. 
Thus, I would like to follow a number of descriptions in the 
Investigations that are significant to the clarification of the 
term ‘meaning’. Later, I would like to exemplify how 
Wittgenstein uses this term when talking about religious 
belief. As has already been mentioned, Wittgenstein tried 
to investigate the term ‘meaning’ from different directions 
by examining the similarities and detecting family 
resemblance between ‘meaning’ and similar concepts: 
“meaning something is like going up to someone” 
(Wittgenstein 2001, §457); or “’I am not merely saying this, 
I mean something by it’ when we consider what is going on 
in us when we mean (and don’t merely say) words, it 
seems to us as if there were something coupled to these 
words, which otherwise would run idle. As if they, so to 
speak, connected with something in us” (Wittgenstein 
2001, §507). Depth Grammar expresses all that accompa-
nies words when a certain person ‘approaches’ them and 
uses them. The subjective-human aspect of the speaker is 
embodied in ‘meaning’ and the identification of meaning 
enables us to point out the ‘deep meaning’ of whatever 
has been said. Meaning is not the fruit of an unconscious 
                                                     
2This is the direction that is preferred by Hacker as well. According to Hacker, 
the clarification of Depth Grammar done by describing the overall use of a 
relevant expression is done after examining all the possible variations the 
relevant expression can have, the circumstances in which it is used, and the 
results of such use. It is important to note that Hacker criticizes the depth 
metaphor and claims that it suits a Tractatus (in which there is seemingly a 
distinction between what can be seen externally – suiting the depth grammar 
definition – and what comes out in the investigation, However, in philosophical 
investigations, Wittgenstein emphasizes time and again that we can see 
everything and that nothing has a ‘concealed essence’ that needs to be 
uncovered. Thus, the contrast is not between ‘surface’ and ‘geology’ but rather 
between ‘local space’ and ‘topographic space’. 
 
instinct of using grammatical rules but rather expresses the 
ties that exist between a person’s soul, personality and his 
action: “why do you want to tell him about an intention too, 
as well as telling him what I did? Not because the intention 
was also something which was going on at that time. But 
because I want to tell him something about myself, which 
goes beyond what happened at that time” (Wittgenstein 
2001, §659). Deep meaning is understood based upon a 
whole set of activities into which language is woven and 
receives its unique design from the speaker’s intention: 
“what is happening now has significance in these 
surroundings. The surroundings give it its importance… (A 
smiling mouth smiles only in a human face)” (Wittgenstein 
2001, §583). ‘Surrounding’ and ‘face’ are not created at 
random but actually are the ‘form of life’ from which 
language use and understanding derive: “By Surface 
Grammar we actually refer to all the formal grammatical 
rules while by Depth Grammar we refer to the circum-
stances and relationships that dictate language use” 
(Kripke 1982, p. 96). This definition stresses the fact that 
there are early assumptions and applications of use that 
need to be taken into account when analyzing use (Ibid, p. 
120) 
Surface Grammar and Depth Grammar of 
Religious Belief 
Thus, religious belief should be examined in context of the 
form of life in which it is expressed. To that analysis one 
must add religion’s subjective design that is embedded in 
‘meaning’ and that can be defined as ‘the deference that 
dictates use’. Such deference creates the Depth Grammar 
that can be analyzed only when compared to the Surface 
Grammar.  
In Lectures on Esthetics, Psychology and Religious 
belief, Wittgenstein compares the use of the word ‘God’ to 
other expressions of religious belief. He claims that: “the 
word ‘God’ is amongst the earliest learnt… the word is 
used like a word representing a person. God sees, 
rewards, etc. being shown all these things, did you 
understand what this word meant? I’d say: yes and no” 
(Wittgenstein 1966, p. 59). According to Wittgenstein, that 
one can understand what the word does not stand for and 
what the different ways to use it are. But understanding 
how to use the word cannot answer questions regarding 
religious foundation: Thus, one cannot examine a person’s 
belief in God or invent devices that could assist in such an 
examination. Even people who claim that their religious 
belief is based on proof will not be able to see the 
committing connection between proof and their religious 
belief. The only common characteristic among all religious 
beliefs is that they direct and design the believer’s way of 
life, In other words, the use and application of religious 
belief in one’s ‘form of life’. However, what does a certain 
religious unique compared to another? This is where I 
would like to integrate the term Depth Grammar. In Culture 
and Value there are many of Wittgenstein’s statements 
regarding religious belief according to which it is possible 
to characterize religious belief’s Depth Grammar as he 
sees it (Wittgenstein 1998). According to Wittgenstein, 
religious belief includes security (Ibid. p.82), love (Ibid. p. 
39), passion (Ibid. p. 61) and goodness (Ibid. p.5). 
Wittgenstein points out the difference between science 
and religious belief and stresses the fact that rational 
doctrines lack the kind of influential power that is capable 
of designing human’s life since they work only on the 
human-rational domain; they do not have any power on 
the emotional or the supernatural domains (Ibid. p. 5). 
Nevertheless, although it seems from what has been 




written above that Wittgenstein defines religious belief’s 
characteristics that can apply to any human being, it is 
necessary to point out that his personal attitude towards 
religious belief that sharpens the definition of Depth 
Grammar of religious belief cannot be defined only by the 
characteristics above mentioned. According to Wittgen-
stein Depth Grammar of religious belief is each individual’s 
personal mission and has no connection whatsoever that 
relates to one’s collective religious life. Wittgenstein is 
walking here the same path taken by two famous 
theologians whom he admired the most: Augustine and 
Kierkegaard. Wittgenstein claims that Confessions is the 
most serious book ever written and that Kierkegaard was 
the profound philosopher of the 19th century. Each of these 
theologians described in his writings the personal process 
he underwent on the journey to discovering his unique 
personal religious belief. Despite the fact that Augustine 
eventually became a monk and Kierkegaard a Protestant 
believer, they both emphasized the centrality of their 
personal identification with the religious way of life and 
their personal position against God and His Will. Augustine 
is far from trying to convince others or from trying to impart 
others with his belief. Nevertheless, he distinguishes 
between one who is reacting to Creation in a religious way 
to someone who is completely indifferent to it. Such a 
distinction resembles Wittgenstein’s words concerning 
what he calls ‘aspect blindness’ (Wittgenstein 2001, p. 
182). This concept can be applied to when reading what 
Augustine wrote: “surely this beauty should be self-evident 
to all who are of sound mind. Then why does it not speak 
to everyone in the same way?… if one person sees while 
another sees and questions, it is not that they appear one 
way to the first and another way to the second. It is rather 
that the created order speaks to all, but it understood by 
those who hear its outward voice and compare it with the 
truth within themselves” (Augustine 1991, 10, §10). While 
observing reality, there are people who confront their inner 
self with the impressions of the world. Such people, claims 
Augustine, will follow the path of religious belief. On the 
other hand, those people for reality means nothing or for 
those who do not compare it to their soul can be defined 
as ‘aspect blind’.3  
                                                     
3 Kierkegaard made a similar comparison in his book Two Ages that describes 
the period of time he  
was living in as passionless and in which people lacked the ability to look into 
their souls. 
Wittgenstein too, as well as Augustine and Kierkegaard, 
demonstrates a process of observing the world that brings 
about a recognition of God and religious belief. Such 
examples can be found in the Notebooks 1914-1916 and 
can be recognized in the Tractatus as well. 
In conclusion, an understanding and analysis of Depth 
Grammar of religious belief depend upon our acquaintance 
with the style of life that gave birth to a certain expression 
and upon the ability to see the aspect that is brought out in 
one’s personal design of religious belief. Thus, general 
criteria and personal criteria are tied together when trying 
to define the term Depth Grammar.  
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